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Cyberspace, Non-State Actors and the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm 
Russell Buchan 
 
Abstract 
 
That states are subject to an obligation to prevent their cyber infrastructure from being used in a 
manner injurious to the international legal rights of other states is well established in customary 
international law. This obligation imposes a dual duty upon states. The first duty is an obligation of 
result insofar as it requires states to implement the laws and institutions necessary to prevent and 
punish malicious cyber conduct emanating from their territory, although international law confers 
upon states a wide margin of appreciation in deciding the design and content of such measures. The 
second duty is an obligation of conduct in the sense that where a threat emanates from their cyber 
infrastructure and states have (actual or constructive) knowledge of that threat they must act 
reasonably in utilising their capacity and resources to suppress it. What is reasonable in the 
circumstances will depend upon various factors operating at the time such as the resources available 
to the state and the risks involved in the particular activity. Taken together, these duties construct 
an international legal obligation which offers states a certain degree of protection from malicious 
transboundary cyber conduct committed by non-state actors. However, the conclusion of an 
international treaty or several international treaties dealing with specific cyber threats will be crucial 
to achieving a secure cyberspace.   
 
Keywords: cyber security; cyber conflict; transboundary harm; cyber due diligence; cyber space  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The presence of non-state actors on the international stage has grown steadily in recent years. The 
unique features of cyberspace, including its borderless character, its inherent interconnectedness, 
the anonymity it affords and its accessibility, has provided a thriving environment for non-state 
actors and cyberspace has thus further empowered non-state actors to act independently from 
states in the international arena. Indeed, it is likely that malicious transboundary cyber conduct 
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committed by non-state actors now exceeds that committed by states.
1
 In an international 
community based upon the sovereignty equality of its member states,
2
 international law demands 
the existence of effective international legal rules that provide states with protection from non-state 
actors that commit malicious cyber conduct from the territory of other states. 
 
Whilst steps have been taken towards making non-state actors responsible for their conduct under 
international law developments in this area have been slow and piecemeal and states remain the 
principal subjects and objects of international law.
3
 States are not generally responsible for the 
conduct of non-state actors that causes detriment to other states simply because of a territorial link; 
that is, state responsibility on the basis that the non-state actor committed such conduct whilst 
within the territory of that state. There are however essentially two ways in which states can be held 
responsible in such circumstances, both of which could potentially be utilised to provide states with 
international legal protection.   
 
First, a state is responsible for the actions of a non-state actor where those actions constitute an 
internationally wrongful conduct and can be attributed to the state;
4
 namely, where the state 
exercised  ‘effective control ? over the unlawful conduct in question.5 However, the use of the 
attribution doctrine to hold states responsible for malicious cyber conduct committed by non-state 
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actors is problematic and unlikely to occur.
6
 The reason for this is because to establish the requisite 
factual link between a state and a non-state actor technical attribution must be necessarily achieved 
- the actor that perpetrated the internationally wrongful act must be accurately identified. This is 
difficult in cyberspace because although devices connected to the internet are assigned internet 
protocol (IP) addresses these do not reveal the specific identity of the device to other users but only 
their general geographic location. Moreover, the use of anonymizing techniques like Botnets and 
anonymising software such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or The Onion Router (Tor) has made it 
even more improbable that the authors of malicious cyber conduct can be identified. In essence, 
these anonymizing techniques and software significantly hinder technical attribution because they 
reroute malicious cyber conduct through the cyber infrastructure of other states and in the process 
are assigned different IP addresses, indicating to the victim that the damaging conduct was launched 
from a computer in a geographical location different from its original source.
7
 Whilst recent 
technological developments have meant that accurate cyber tracing is now possible it is still 
extremely difficult.
8
  Yet, even if the author of malicious cyber conduct can be identified, satisfying 
the international legal criteria for attribution is nevertheless difficult because the test for attribution 
is that of effective control or, in the words of the International Law Commission  (ILC), the state must 
ŚĂǀĞ ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ? ? ‘ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƵŶůĂǁĨƵůĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?9 As has been well documented in 
the literature, this requires ĂŶ ‘exceptionally high ? degree of factual control to be exercised in order 
for legal attribution to be established.
10
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Second, a state can incur responsibility where it fails to satisfy a primary obligation, whether 
conventional or customary, to take positive action in relation to the conduct of a non-state actor 
operating within its territory or, more broadly, subject to its jurisdiction. Importantly, there is a 
positive obligation contained in customary international law which requires states to prevent their 
territory from being used in a manner contrary to the international legal rights of other states.
11
 In 
evaluating the effectiveness of international law in suppressing malicious transboundary cyber 
conduct committed by non-state actors the utility of this customary obligation is twofold.
12
  First, 
unlike attribution, the obligation to prevent doctrine obviates the need to specifically identity the 
author of the cyber conduct (technical attribution) because it applies where harmful conduct 
ĞŵĂŶĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵĐǇďĞƌŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚŽŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ. As we know, IP addresses reveal 
the general geo-location of the computer used to launch the cyber operation. Significantly, this 
customary obligation applies regardless of whether the harmful conduct originated in that territory 
or is instead transiting through it, as would be the case where a non-state actor reroutes malicious 
cyber conduct through cyber infrastructure located on the territory of another state using a Botnet 
or IP spoofing software such as a VPN or Tor.  Second, whereas attribution requires the state to have 
exercised effective control over the individual committing the unlawful conduct, the obligation to 
prevent doctrine exhibits ƚŚĞ ‘ůĞƐƐďƵƌĚĞŶƐŽŵĞ ?13 requirement that the state knew or ought to have 
known that harmful conduct was emanating from its territory and failed to take all reasonable 
measures to terminate that conduct or mitigate the extent of its harmful effects.  
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Whilst much academic energy has been dedicated to examining the attribution doctrine in the 
context of cyberspace,
14
 academic investigation into the customary obligation upon states to 
prevent transboundary harm as a legal mechanism to protect state sovereignty from malicious cyber 
operations has received significantly less attention.
15
 In light of this, the objective of this article is to 
assess the application of the obligation to prevent doctrine to states whose cyber infrastructure is 
being used by non-state actors to commit malicious transboundary cyber conduct and, more 
specifically, to determine the nature, scope and content of this legal obligation.  
 
In pursuit of this objective this article is structured as follows. Section 2 identifies the obligation to 
prevent transboundary harm as a general obligation under customary international law. Section 3 
argues that this obligation actually contains two distinct duties, one requiring states to possess a 
minimum legal and administrative apparatus capable of preventing non-state actors from using their 
cyber infrastructure to commit injurious transboundary conduct and, the other, requiring states to 
utilise this apparatus diligently to suppress threats emanating from their territory. Section 4 argues 
that the first duty integrated into the obligation to prevent principle is an obligation of result and 
explores the legislative and administrative features that a state must exhibit in order suppress 
malicious cyber conduct. Section 5 argues that second duty built into the obligation to prevent is an 
obligation of conduct and identifies the factors that are used to inform the standard of due diligence 
to which a state will be held when utilising its resources to address cyber threats emanating from its 
cyber infrastructure. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks on the utility of the obligation to 
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15
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prevent doctrine in providing states with effective international legal protection against malicious 
cyber conduct committed by non-state actors in foreign jurisdictions.    
 
 
2. The Customary Obligation to Prevent Harm 
 
The obligation upon states to prevent their territory from being used to cause harm to other states 
has deep roots in international law. The most famous articulation of this customary obligation can 
be found in the Corfu case in 1949.
16
 In this case two British warships struck mines whilst passing 
through an international strait in Albanian waters. Whilst the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was 
unable to conclude that the mines had been laid by Albania, the ICJ determined that the Albanian 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞŬŶŽǁŶŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶĞƐ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŚĂĚĂĚuty to warn ships 
ƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌĂŝƚ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞ/:ďĂƐĞĚŝƚƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽŶ ‘ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů and well-
recognized principles ?ŶĂŵĞůǇ,  ‘ĞǀĞƌǇ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽĂůůŽǁŬŶŽǁŝŶŐůǇŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇƚŽďĞ
used for acts contrary to the rights of other SƚĂƚĞƐ ?.17 /ŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ
ŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?refers to acts of non-sate actors that, if they had been committed by a state, would 
amount to an internationally wrongful act. 
 
At its creation many argued that as a virtual world cyberspace was an a-territorial environment and 
thus immune from sovereign claims.
18
 If this view is correct then the obligation upon states to 
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17
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18
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prevent transboundary harm, which is imposed upon states in relation to activities occurring within 
their sovereign territory, is inapplicable to malicious conduct emanating from cyberspace. 
 
Recent state practice however illustrates that states do in fact exercise territorial sovereignty over 
those aspects of cyberspace which are supported by physical infrastructure located within their 
territory.
19
  As a result, states have recognised the applicability of the customary international law 
obligation to prevent transboundary harm to threats that emerge from their cyber infrastructure.  
The US, for example, has explained ƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ‘ƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĂŶĚĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚƐĞĐƵƌĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĨƌŽŵĚĂŵĂŐĞŽƌŵŝƐƵƐĞ ? ?20  Indeed, 
the applicability of this obligation to cyberspace is confirmed by Rule 5 of the Tallinn Manual, which 
explains that  ‘ ?Ă ?^ƚĂƚĞƐŚĂůůŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŝŶŐůǇĂůůŽǁƚŚĞĐǇďĞƌŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚ ƌĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶŝƚƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŽƌ
under its exclusive governmental control to be used for acts that adversely and unlawfully affect 
ŽƚŚĞƌ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?21 ImportanƚůǇ ?ƚŚŝƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽŚĂƌŵĨƵůĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞŵĂŶĂƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
territory, which includes host states but also transiting states. For example, in the Nicaragua case 
the ICJ held that Nicaragua was under an obligation to prevent its territory from being used as a 
trafficking route for military equipment intended for insurgents in El Salvador.
22
 By analogy, in 
cyberspace the customary obligation to prevent transboundary harm applies not only to states 
whose cyber infrastructure is being used by non-state actors as a launch pad for malicious cyber 
conduct but also extends to those states whose cyber infrastructure is being used as a conduit for 
                                                          
19
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the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (CUP, 2013). 
20
 The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked 
World (2011) 10 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.   
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 Tallinn Manual (n 19) Rule 5. 
22
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) 
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 157. 
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malicious cyber operations which were concocted and perpetrated by non-state actors in another 
state and are making their way to their final destination elsewhere.    
 
3. Scope and Nature of the Obligation to Prevent Transboundary Harm  
 
Where international law imposes upon a state an obligation to take positive action it is necessary to 
categorise that international legal duty either as an obligation of result or an obligation of conduct.
23
 
Obligations of result impose an  ‘absolute ?24  obligation upon states to  ‘ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞ ?25 that a precise 
result is attained. Failure by a state to meet this obligation will constitute an internationally wrongful 
act regardless of whether the state was at fault in failing to achieve the result.
 
In contrast, 
obligations of conduct ĂƌĞ ‘ŶŽŶ-ĂďƐŽůƵƚĞ ?26 and do not require specific results to be achieved but 
instead require that states  ‘ĚĞƉůŽǇĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞŵĞĂŶƐ ?ƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞďĞƐƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ?ƚŽĚŽƚŚĞ
utmost, to obtain [the] ƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ?27 Transgression of an obligation of conduct therefore only occurs 
where it can be proved that the state is at fault; responsibility hinges upoŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽ
exercise adequate vigilance, care or prudence or, to utilise the current international law terminology, 
the state fails to exercise due diligence. In the Genocide case the ICJ provided a useful explanation of 
the nature of obligations of conduct  
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 On the difference between these types of obligations see P-DĞƉƵǇ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐŽĨ
ŽĚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ PKŶŐŽ ?ƐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨKďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨDĞĂŶƐĂŶĚKďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨZĞƐƵůƚŝŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ^ƚĂƚĞ
ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?EJIL 371. 
24
 R Pisillo-DĂǌǌĞƐĐŚŝ ? ‘dŚĞƵĞŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞZƵůĞĂŶĚƚŚĞEĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ƚĂƚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
German Yearbook of International Law 9, 35. 
25
 Ibid, 26. 
26
 J <ƵůĞƐǌĂ ? ‘ƵĞŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞŝŶǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?ŝŶIM Portela and F Almeida, Organizational, Legal, and 
Technological Doimeisons of Information System Administration (Information Science, 2014) 76, 79. 
27
 Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the 
Area, Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Advisory Opinion (2011)  
para 110.  
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it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of result, in 
the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the 
circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the obligation of States 
parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to 
prevent genocide as far as possible.
28
   
 
Thus, the dispositive factor in evaluating whether a state acted with due diligence is whether the 
state acted as any other reasonable state would have done in those circumstances. To put the 
matter differently, it will concluded that a state failed to act with due diligence where it can be 
ƐŚŽǁŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ‘an insufficiency of governmental actions so far short of international 
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐƚŚĂƚĞǀĞƌǇƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĂŶĚŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůŵĂŶǁŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚŝůǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞŝƚƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?29 Note 
that where a state fails to conduct itself reasonably and violates an obligation of conduct the state is 
liable for the failure to prevent the unlawful conduct and not for the act that produces the resulting 
harm,
30
 which is significant from the perspective of the adequacy of compensation/reparations 
owed to the victim and, for example, the nature and extent of countermeasures that the victim state 
can adopt.   
 
It is the language of a particular obligation that provides the clues as to whether it is to be 
interpreted as an obligation of result or an obligation of conduct. The ILC has explained that where 
international law imposes upon a state an obligation that requires it to prevent certain types of 
                                                          
28
 Bosnian Genocide (n 5)  para 430. 
29
 USA (L.F. Neer) v. United Mexican States (1926) RIAA iv 60, 61-2. 
30
  ‘ ?d ?ŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŝƐŶĞǀĞƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝ ƵĂůĂƐƐƵĐŚ PƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŵĞƌĞůǇ
occasions the responsibility of the state by revealing the state in an illegality of its own  W an omission to 
prevent or punish, or positive encourageŵĞŶƚŽĨ ?ƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ?ĂŐůĞƚŽŶ ?The Responsibility of 
States in International Law (New York, New York Press 1928) 77.    
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activity then that obligation usually takes the form of an obligation of conduct P ‘[o]bligations of 
prevention are usually construed as best efforts obligations, requiring States to take all reasonable 
or necessary measures to prevent a given event from occurring, but without warranting that the 
event will not occur ? ?31 The implication, then, is that the customary international law obligation upon 
states to prevent their territory from being used to cause detriment to other states is an obligation 
of conduct. Importantly, however, in his seminal work on the topic of state responsibility Pisillo- 
Mazzeschi argues that the position is rather more complex. In particular, he argues that a 
 
careful examination of [state] practice reveals that the obligation to prevent has a 
twofold content; that is, it includes two distinct obligations of the State. The first 
is that of possessing, on a permanent basis, a legal and administrative apparatus 
normally able to guarantee respect for the international norm on prevention. The 
second obligation, instead, is that of using such apparatus with the diligence that 
the circumstances require.
32
 
 
As we shall see below, the first duty imposed by the obligation to prevent is characterised as an 
obligation of result whereas the second duty is an obligation of conduct.    
 
 
4. Developing State Capacity: an Obligation of Result 
 
                                                          
31
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries (2001), 62. 
32
 Pisillo-Mazzeschi (n 24) 26.  
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The obligation of prevention imposes a duty upon states to engage in capacity building in the sense 
that they must equip themselves with the means to detect, prevent, mitigate and punish conduct by 
non-state actors within their territory that is contrary to the international legal rights of other states. 
Developing state capacity capable of preventing such conduct will invariably require  ‘the enacting of 
legislation and regulations and the establishment of an effective administrative and judicial 
ĂƉƉĂƌĂƚƵƐ ? ?33  
 
As an obligation of result
34
 the important question becomes what specific legislative measures and 
administrative apparatus a state must implement in order to discharge its duty to prevent its 
territory from being used in a manner injurious to the international legal rights of other states. 
Generally speaking, this would include those laws and institutions that are  ‘ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞŽĨ
ĂŶǇ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? that exercises effective control over its territory,35 which as we know is a key 
criterion for a political community to be recognised as a state under international law.
36
 But the 
question still remains as to what are the specific legal and institutional features necessary for a state 
to be regarded as being in effective control of its territory. In particular, and in relation to the 
legislative and administrative measures necessary for a state to be regarded as being in effective 
control of its cyber infrastructure, does international law require the implementation of regulatory 
frameworks that incentivize or even cajole providers of information and communication technology 
(ICT) such as search engines, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), software providers etc to suppress 
                                                          
33
 Tonkin (n 12) 70. 
34
  ‘,ĂǀŝŶŐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞĚƵĂůĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ
duty of the State to possess a minimum legal and administrative apparatus is not in any way conditioned by 
ƚŚĞĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞƌƵůĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŝƚŝƐĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞƐƵůƚ ? ? ?Pisillo-Mazzeschi (n 24) 27. 
35
  ‘[States] should possess a legal system and sufficient resources to maintain an adequate administrative 
apparatus to control and monitor the activities. It is however understood that the degree of care expected of a 
State with a well-developed economy and human and material resources and with highly evolved systems and 
structures of government is different from States which are not so well-placed. Even in the latter case, 
vigilance, employment of infrastructure and monitoring of hazardous activities in the territory of the State, 
which is a natural attribute of ĂŶǇ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƌĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?International Law Commission, Commentary to 
the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 2001, 155. 
36
 Article 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933. 
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malicious cyber conduct? Does this duty require states to criminalise certain types of malicious cyber 
conduct, perhaps even accompanied by specific forms of punishment (such as incarceration, for 
example)? In order to meet their international law obligation must states also create institutions 
specifically dedicated to providing cyber security, such as Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs), which are specialised entities that can detect, suppress and mitigate malicious cyber 
operations? Does this duty require states to devise policies and develop processes that can facilitate 
the sharing of information amongst the various ICT stakeholders, both public and private?  
 
When international law requires states to take positive action and achieve a particular result but the 
primary obligation does not specify the exact measures that a state must deploy so as to achieve 
that result international tribunals have accorded states a wide margin of appreciation in choosing 
which specific measures to adopt.
37
 With regard to the customary obligation upon states to prevent 
their territory from being used in a manner injurious to the legal rights of other states Lauterpacht 
has noted 
 
International law is not concerned with the manner in which states elect to meet 
this partiĐƵůĂƌĚƵƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐ ?^ŽůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƐĞůĂǁƐĂƌĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƚŽ
prevent hostile acts or to punish them after they have occurred, the state has 
performed its duty. But should it visit such offences by small fines, or, with regard 
to foreigners, by expulsion only, or should its laws be of such nature that, 
notwithstanding their theoretical comprehensiveness, they are in fact incapable 
of enforcement, then again it will find it difficult to escape liability for hostile acts 
                                                          
37
 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v USA) (2009) ICJ Rep 3, para 44. 
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rendered more probable as a result of the leniency or technical shortcomings of 
its laws.
38
  
 
Where international law wishes to impose obligations upon states that require them to implement 
specific measures (such as regulatory frameworks and institutions) a treaty will usually be necessary. 
In the context of malicious transboundary cyber conduct committed by non-state actors the Council 
of Europe ?Ɛ Convention on Cybercrime ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƐƚĂƚĞƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƚŽĂĚŽƉƚ ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶƐĞƐůŝƐƚĞĚŝŶthe ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂƌĞ ‘ƉƵŶŝƐŚĂďůĞďǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƚĞĂŶĚĚŝƐƐƵĂƐŝǀĞƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?39  In particular, the Convention requires states parties to 
criminalise conduct that falls into one of four categories: offences against the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of computer systems; computer related offences (forgery, fraud); content-
related offences (child pornography); and offences related to infringement of copyright and related 
rights.
40
 The Convention requires states to adopt measures to establish procedures for the purpose 
of criminal investigations into, and criminal proceedings for, these offences.
41
 In addition, the 
Convention contains a number of provisions on mutual assistance and extradition which are 
ĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŽƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƐƚĞǆƚĞŶƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
for the purposes of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂŶĚĚĂƚĂ ?ŽƌĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐĨŽƌŵŽĨĂĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ? ?42 As an 
example, Article 35 requires that states  ‘ĚĞsignate a point of contact available on a twenty-four hour, 
seven-day-a-week basis, in order to ensure the provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of 
                                                          
38
 ,>ĂƵƚĞƌƉĂĐŚƚ ? ‘ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐďǇWƌŝǀĂƚĞWĞƌƐŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?AJIL 105, 128. 
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 Article 13, Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe), CETS No 185, 23 November 2001. See generally P 
<ĂƐƚŶĞƌĂŶĚ&DĠŐƌĞƚ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>ĞŐĂůŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨǇďĞƌĐƌŝŵĞ ? ?dƐĂŐŽƵƌŝĂƐĂŶĚƵĐŚĂŶ ?Research 
Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (n 15) 190. 
40
 In 2003 an Additional Protocol to the Convention was adopted which requires signatory states to criminalise 
conduct relating to the dissemination of racist and xenophobic material on the internet; Additional Protocol to 
the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature 
Committed Through Computer Systems (Council of Europe), CETS No 189, 28 January 2003.     
41
 Convention on Cybercrime (n 34), Article 14(1). 
42
 Ibid, Article 23. 
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investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related to computer systems and data, or 
for the collection of evidence in electronic form of a criminal offence ?.43   
 
Since the early 1960s states have adopted various multilateral and regional treaties relating to 
terrorism. As many of these conventions pre-dated the cyber era they do not refer to cyber 
terrorism specifically but their definition of terrorist-related activities is sufficiently broad to 
encompass acts of terrorism perpetrated through cyber means.
44
 More recent instruments do refer 
specifically to cyber terrorism.
45
 The gist of these conventions is to define conduct as terrorist-
related and to impose obligations upon states parties to criminalise such conduct and exercise their 
jurisdiction when these offences are committed. Moreover, under Chapter VII UN Charter the 
Security Council has adopted resolutions imposing binding obligations upon UN member states to 
adopt specific counter-terrorism measures.
46
 Again, whilst these resolutions do not refer to cyber 
terrorism specifically, their definition of terrorist-related activity is sufficiently broad to include such 
conduct. Inter alia, these resolutions impose obligations upon member states to designate as serious 
criminal offences the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in support 
of terrorist acts and to provide other states with warnings and information where they are at threat 
of terrorist activities.  
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 dŚĞĨƌŝĐĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶǇďĞƌ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚWĞƌƐŽŶĂůĂƚĂWƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚ
designed to promote cyber security. Whilst the treaty has been adopted it is not yet in force.  This 
notwithstanding, if/when it comes into force it will require member states to, inter alia ?ĂĚŽƉƚ ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ
and/or regulatory measures as it deems effective by considering as substantive criminal offences acts which 
affect the confidentiality, integrity, availability and survival of information and communication technology 
systems, the data they process and the underlying network infrastructure, as well as effective procedural 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞĂŶĚƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ? ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨƌŝĐĂŶhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŽŶǇďĞƌ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
and Personal Data Protection 2014. 
44
 For a good discussion of how these instruments apply to cyber terrorism see in this volume D Fidler, 
 ‘ǇďĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ?dĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ?  
45
 See for example ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism 2007. The Convention on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation 2010 and the Protocol Supplemental to the Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 2010 also refer specifically to acts of cyber terrorism but 
these agreements have yet to enter into force. 
46
 SC Res 1373 (2001); SC Res 2178 (2014). 
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From the perspective of this article it is important to note that the Convention on Cybercrime only 
concerns malicious cyber conduct that the treaty classifies as criminal and the relevant anti-terrorist 
conventions and Security Council resolutions encompass only that type of cyber conduct which falls 
within their definition of terrorism. Thus, these international legal regimes do not comprehensively 
address all forms of malicious cyber conduct that violate the international legal rights of other states 
and consequently there will be many instances where states continue to look to the customary 
international law obligation upon states to prevent transboundary harm for protection.  
 
5. Utilising State Capacity: an Obligation of Conduct 
 
Where a state is to found to be in possession of the requisite laws and institutions the obligation of 
prevention requires it to utilise this apparatus in order to address known threats. As an obligation of 
conduct this is an obligation conditioned by the due diligence standard.  In many fields of 
international law primary obligations have appeared which have been interpreted as requiring states 
to exercise due diligence in the pursuit of particular results, such as in the fields of international 
environmental law, international diplomatic law and international human rights law.
47
  
 
Although these due diligence obligations are located within specific international legal frameworks 
and thus their content is defined by reference to the primary norm within which they are contained, 
the way in which these due diligence standards have been interpreted within different international 
legal contexts can be nevertheless used as an aid to interpret due diligence standards found in other 
                                                          
47
 See generally International Law Association, Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, First Report 
(7 March 2014) http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/1045.  
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primary obligations of international law.
48
  In this sense, whilst due diligence obligations may not 
possess a unified content they do contain core features and thus exhibit a  ‘common standard ?.49 It is 
the objective of this section to identify the core features of the due diligence standard and, more 
specifically, to define the material contents of the obligation of due diligence with particular 
reference to the customary obligation upon states to use their capacity to prevent their cyber 
infrastructure from being used by non-state actors as a platform to commit malicious transboundary 
conduct.  
 
 
5.1 Knowledge 
 
<ŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?50 and it is only where a state has knowledge of 
a threat that the obligation upon it to use its capacity to suppress that threat is triggered.
51
 Note 
however that just because a threat emanates from ǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚŝƚis 
automatically assumed to have known of the threat. In the Corfu case it was held ƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞ
concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a State over its territory and waters that 
ƚŚĂƚ^ƚĂƚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŬŶĞǁ ?ŽƌŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŚĂǀĞŬŶŽǁŶ ?ǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?52  
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 ZĂƌŶŝĚŐĞ:ƌ ? ‘dŚĞƵĞŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƵŶĚĞƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?International Community Law 
Review 81, 92. 
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 K ?ŽŶŽŐŚƵĞ ? ‘dŚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨ'ŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇďǇ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐ PdŚĞZŽůĞŽĨƵĞ
Diligence Obligations after ConfůŝĐƚ ? ?D^ĂƵůĂŶĚ:^ǁĞĞŶĞǇ ?ĞĚƐ ? ?International Law and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Policy (Routledge, 2015) 48. 
50
 K Bannelier-ŚƌŝƐƚĂŬŝƐ ? ‘ǇďĞƌŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ P>Žǁ-Intensity Due Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber 
KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Baltic Yearbook of International Law 23, 28.  
51
  ‘ ? ?^ƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐĚƵƚǇƚŽĂĐƚ ?ĂƌŝƐĞĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƐƚĂŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞůĞĂƌŶƐ
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Bosnian Genocide (n 5) para 431. 
52
 Corfu Channel (n 11) 18. 
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Where the state has actual knowledge of the threat the duty of due diligence is obviously activated. 
Interestingly, in the Corfu case the ICJ concluded that Albania was subject to a duty to prevent 
because the evidence indicated ƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞŬŶŽǁŶ ?53 of the mines and the threat that they 
represented. This conclusion was based on the fact that; Albania kept  ‘a jealous watch over its 
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůǁĂƚĞƌƐ ?54 and that the mines were laid so close to Albania ?ƐĐŽĂƐƚline ƚŚĂƚ ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞůĂǇŝŶŐŽĨĂ
minefield in these waters could hardly fail to have been observed by the Albanian coastal 
ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞƐ ?;55 Alabama frequently used military force within the strait;56 Albania demanded that 
foreign vessels request  ‘permission ? before they entered the strait.57  The preparedness of the Court 
to presume knowledge derives from the fact that one cannot deny knowledge of facts that are 
widely known, such as where facts are reported through official government channels or even in the 
media generally.
58
 In the context of cyber, for example, a state may be presumed to have knowledge 
of a threat where it intensively guards and patrols its cyber infrastructure, where it is widely 
reported that ĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ cyber infrastructure is infected with particular malware and where a state has 
become a well-known sanctuary for those wishing to organise and launch malicious cyber operations.  
 
An important question concerns the adequacy of constructive knowledge. The International Group 
of Experts that drafted the Tallinn Manual were unable to reach a consensus on whether the 
obligation of prevention applies where the state ought to have known of the threat.
59
 Case law 
however seems to support an interpretation in favour of the adequacy of constructive knowledge 
because  ‘ŝƚǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶĐŽŶŐƌƵŽƵƐŝĨĂƐƚĂƚĞĐŽƵůĚĂǀŽŝĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇďǇĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐŝƚƐůĂĐŬŽĨ
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knowledge if it could have discovered the prohibited activity through diligĞŶƚĚĞƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?.60 In Corfu it 
was explained that  
 
It is true, as international practice shows, that a State on whose territory or in 
whose waters an act contrary to international law has occurred, may be called 
upon to give an explanation. It is also true that that State cannot evade such a 
request by limiting itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the 
act and its authors.
61
 
 
Similarly, in the Genocide ĐĂƐĞƚŚĞ/:ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘to incur responsibility  ? it is enough that the 
State was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ? ?62  
 
In light of the adequacy of constructive knowledge the question becomes whether it is reasonable to 
expect the state to have known of the threat in light of the circumstances prevailing at that time. 
Relevant circumstances include the technical capacity of the state in question. Thus, it is not 
reasonable to expect a state with under-developed technical capacity to detect highly sophisticated 
malicious cyber operations in the same way as a technologically advanced state. Similarly, in an 
instantaneous environment like cyberspace ĐǇďĞƌŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĐĐƵƌĂƚĂŶ ‘ƵŶďĞůŝĞǀĂďůĞƐƉĞĞĚ ? and 
this also needs to be factored into the equation when determining whether the state should have 
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reasonably known of the threat ?ƐĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ.63 This is especially the case where a malicious cyber 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐǇďĞƌŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? 
 
As knowledge can be constructed international law imposes a monitoring obligation upon states in 
the sense that states must keep themselves informed of threats emanating from their territory.
64
 
There is a legitimate concern here that the duty upon states to actively monitor their cyber 
infrastructure in search of threats could be exploited by malevolent states to encroach upon the 
fundamental human rights of its citizens, especially the right to privacy. However, our fears should 
not be overstated because, as was explained in the Genocide case, when discharging a due diligence 
obligation to prevent (in this case genocide)  ‘ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚĞǀĞƌǇ^ƚĂƚĞŵĂy only act within the limits 
ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚďǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ? ?65 Indeed, that states must respect the right to privacy when 
operating in cyberspace has been affirmed by the UN General Assembly,
66
 UN Human Rights 
Officials
67
 and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy.
68
 Thus, the obligation upon states 
to detect threats in cyberspace  ‘cannot legitimise violations of international human rights law or 
ŽƚŚĞƌƌƵůĞƐ ?.69  
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5.2 The Duty to Prevent 
 
Where a threat is known, or should be reasonably known in the circumstances, the crucial question 
ŝƐ ‘ ?ǁ ?ŚĂƚĞǆĂĐƚůǇĚŽĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĂŶĚŚŽǁŵƵĐŚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĐĂŶ
ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŽĨĂƐƚĂƚĞŝŶĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĐĂƐĞ ? ?70 Broadly speaking, the obligation to prevent 
requires states to use their legislative framework and institutional apparatus to address threats 
which either originate within their territory or are transiting through it and, if harm occurs, to 
mitigate its effects. States must also use their capacity to investigate and punish harmful activities 
where they occur.
71
  
 
It is important to underscore that the obligation to prevent encompasses a duty to investigate and, 
where appropriate, ƉƵŶŝƐŚƚŚŽƐĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞƐƵĐŚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƐĞƌǀĞƐ ‘ĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ
function ďǇƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?s prohibitory measures and deterring other potential 
ǁƌŽŶŐĚŽĞƌƐ ? ?72  ‘dŚĞĚƵƚǇƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞ ?ůŝŬĞƚŚĞĚƵƚǇƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚďƌĞĂĐŚĞĚŵĞƌĞůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞ
investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, it must be undertaken in a serious 
manner and not as mere formalitǇƉƌĞŽƌĚĂŝŶĞĚƚŽďĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?.73  Depending upon the nature of the 
harmful activity, this may require a criminal investigation and prosecution. In the Janes case, for 
example, the Tribunal explained that Mexican authorities failed in their duty of due diligence to 
protect from harm an AmerŝĐĂŶĐŝƚŝǌĞŶŝŶDĞǆŝĐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ƚŚĞDĞǆŝĐĂŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƚŽŽŬŶŽƉƌŽƉĞƌ
steps to apprehend and punish Carbajal [the individual responsible for killing the American national] 
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[and] that such efforts as weƌĞŵĂĚĞǁĞƌĞůĂǆĂŶĚŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?.74 The Tribunal concluded that  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ
culprit is liable for having killed or murdered an American national; the Government is liable for not 
ŚĂǀŝŶŐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚƵƉƚŽŝƚƐĚƵƚǇŽĨĚŝůŝŐĞŶƚůǇƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇƉƵŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌ ? ?75 
 
In other instances investigations of a non-criminal nature may be considered appropriate, such as 
the use of public inquiries or fact-finding commissions, and the use of non-criminal sanctions, such 
as fines or rescinding operating licenses. In the Corfu case the ICJ chastised Albania for not setting up 
a cŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚĞŵŝŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƌĂŝƚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ'ƌĞĞŬŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ ? ‘ŶŽƌĚŝĚŝƚ
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚƚŽƚŚĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂůŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐƵŵďĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƐƵĐŚĂĐĂƐĞ ?ŽŶƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶ ? ?76   
 
Fundamentally, ascertaining the precise demands of due diligence in any given situation is 
determined according to what is reasonable in the circumstances.
77
 The question is whether a 
reasonable state in those circumstances would have acted as the state under examination did. Given 
such a test it is clear that  ‘ ?ǀ ?arious parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly 
discharged the [DD] ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?.78  Due diligence obligations therefore have  ‘Ăn elastic and 
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?79 and embody Ă ‘ĨůĞǆŝďůĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞŶĞƐƐƐƚĂŶdard adaptable to the particular facts 
ĂŶĚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?80 As a result,  ‘[t]ŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨ “ĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐŵĂǇŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇďĞ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶƉƌĞĐŝƐĞƚĞƌŵƐ ? “ĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐĂǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ?.81 This being said, determining 
whether a state acted reasonably in addressing a threat will require consideration of a number of 
key factors, primarily the capacity of the state in question and risks involved in the particular activity. 
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5.2.1 State Capacity  
 
 
As an obligation of conduct rather than result determining how a reasonable state would have 
reacted to a threat is subject to an  ‘available means ? analysis, which requires identification of the 
financial, technical and human resources of the state. The crux of the matter ŝƐƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ ?ĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?
obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
ďƵƌĚĞŶŽŶƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?82 This was central to the ICJ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐin the Genocide case where it held 
that in order to discharge its due diligence obligation to prevent genocide a state is required to take 
only those ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?83 
 
The consequence of this available means test is that  ‘[t]he due diligence standard ... varies in many 
contexts on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities ?.84 For example, in the Armed 
Activities case the ICJ determined that Congo did not violate its obligation of due diligence by failing 
to prevent dissident armed groups located within its territory from using armed force against 
Uganda because of the inimical geographical terrain from where the armed group operated and also 
the material inability of the government to control that part of its territory.
85
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The notion of differentiated responsibilities is particularly important in the context of cyberspace 
because the technical capabilities of states differ so drastically. As we have already seen, one of 
primary reasons for why cyberspace is such a difficult environment to regulate is because actors can 
easily obfuscate their identity. Another reason is because actors can easily conceal malware within 
ostensibly legitimate computer operations. Technologically advanced states will possess 
sophisticated cyber tracing techniques that enable authorities to accurately identify those 
responsible for committing malicious cyber operations and thus take enforcement action against 
them and will also be able to better decipher computer codes in order to ascertain whether they 
contain malware. International law requires these states to do more to counter cyber threats 
emanating from their territory than those possessing less technical capacity.  Note however that the 
standard of due diligence owed in any particular case can become more demanding ŝĨĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
capacity changes  
 
[Due diligence] may change over time as measures considered sufficiently diligent at a 
certain moment may become not diligent enough in light, for instance, of new scientific 
or technological knowledge.
86
 
 
Thus, ŝĨŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂŶĚŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ ?ŽƌƉĞƌŚĂƉƐĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ
may be, then the standard of due diligence owed will be elevated or reduced. This is important 
in relation to cyberspace because it means that as states engage in knowledge transfer and 
capacity building  W which can occur rapidly and dramatically ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐǇďĞƌ
capabilities  W there will be a correlative increase in the intensity of the duty they owe in terms 
of policing their cyber infrastructure and addressing threats that emanate from within it.   
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If the capacity of a state indicates that suppressing a cyber threat is  ‘ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇŝŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ?ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ
that fails to do so is not in breach of its due diligence obligation; the diligence that is due under the 
ůĞŐĂůƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĐĂŶŶŽƚĞǆĐĞĞĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?87  It is important to stress however that where 
a state is unable to prevent harmful conduct emanating from its territory it must nevertheless do all 
that is reasonable in light of its capacity to mitigate the effects of the damaging conduct. At a very 
minimum, a state that lacks the technical means to suppress a cyber threat should notify and warn 
those states that are likely to be the victim of the attack and, where reasonable, cooperate with 
likely victim states so as to help prevent or mitigate the attack, such as providing details as to whom 
is perpetrating the attack, when the attack will occur, the nature of the attack and which 
infrastructure is likely to be targeted. In the Corfu case the I:ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĂƚŝŶůŝŐŚƚŽĨůďĂŶŝĂ ?Ɛ
knowledge of the mines in its territorial sea it should have notified/warned approaching vessels 
about the risk and its failure to do so amounted to a violation of its customary obligation to prevent 
harm.
88
  
 
Related to this, where a state is a victim or likely victim of damaging conduct and the source of the 
threat emanates from different actors operating from cyber infrastructure located within different 
states each host state must do its part to help prevent the threat or alleviate it effects. In the 
Genocide case the ICJ opined that  
  
it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even 
proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its disposal, they would 
not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide. As well as being generally 
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difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of the obligation of conduct in 
question, the more so since the possibility remains that the combined efforts of 
several States, each complying with its obligation to prevent, might have achieved 
the result  ?  averting the commission of genocide  ?  which the efforts of only one 
State were insufficient to produce.
89
 
 
dŚĞŬĞǇŝƐƐƵĞŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚĂƐƚĂƚĞĐĂŶŶŽƚ ‘ĚŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?90 when its territory is being used as a platform 
to launch injurious conduct. Take for example a DDOS attack that emanates from many hundreds or 
even thousands of zombied computers located in different states across the globe. One state acting 
alone is unlikely to be able to prevent the attack. States cannot remain inert however. Instead, 
international law requires each state to take all reasonable measures to contribute to preventing the 
threat or dampening its effects.   
 
The standard of due diligence owed in any given situation is not only affected by the resources 
available to the state but also by the degree of influence that the state exercises over the actor that 
is the source of the threat. In the Genocide case the ICJ explained that when determining the degree 
of ĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ 
 
capacity to influence effectively the action of persons likely to commit, or already 
committing, genocide. This capacity itself depends, among other things, on the 
geographical distance of the State concerned from the scene of the events, and on 
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the strength of the political links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the 
authorities of that State and the main actors in the events.
91
 
 
 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞŝƚǁĂƐŚĞůĚƚŚĂƚ ‘&ZzǁĂs in a position of influence over the Bosnian Serbs who devised 
ĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚƚŚĞŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ?92 and that its failure to do so engaged its international responsibility.   
 
In recent years there has been a rise in so-called patriotic hackers that commit cyber attacks against 
other states in defence of the (perceived) interests of their nation state.
93
 In 2007 Estonia was 
subject to widespread and systematic DDOS attacks after it decided to relocate a statute 
commemorating Russian soldiers that were killed during World Word II. Reports into the incident 
revealed that the origins of the cyber attacks were from computer networks located within Russia
94
 
and Estonia quickly alleged that the Russian government was responsible.
95
 Definitive attribution 
however could not be established. But even if Russia did not commit the DDOS attacks and they 
were instead committed by Russian nationals disgruntled by ƐƚŽŶŝĂ ?Ɛ decision to relocate the 
statute, Russia was nevertheless subject to an obligation under customary international law to 
prevent its cyber infrastructure from being used to interfere with ƐƚŽŶŝĂ ?ƐƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇand this 
required the Russian government to exercise its influence over those individuals which sought to act 
in defence of Russian interests so as to discourage the attacks and bring them to an end. 
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5.2.2 Degree of Risk 
 
The Seabed Disputes Chamber has explained that the demands of the due diligence obligation  ‘ŵĂǇ
ĂůƐŽĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?96  In this context risk can take two forms. 
 
First, the due diligence standard can become more or less demanding depending upon the likelihood 
of the threat occurring. Where there is a greater likelihood of a threat occurring a state will be 
required to dedicate more of its resources to addressing the threat in order to be considered to have 
acted with reasonable diligence. Conversely, the action required by a state will be less demanding 
where the probability of harm occurring is tenuous and remote. For example, the ILC has stated that 
when fixing the standard of due diligence to assess the legality of state conduct it must be 
 ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂŶĚƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůƚŽƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨƌŝƐŬŽĨƚƌĂŶƐďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇŚĂƌŵŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ?97 
 
In the Genocide case the ICJ held that &ZzŬŶĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƐŶŝĂŶ^ĞƌďƐĞŵďƌĂĐĞĚĂ ‘ĚĞĞƉ-seated 
ŚĂƚƌĞĚ ? of the Muslims ĂŶĚƐŽŝƚǁĂƐ ‘ĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƌŝƐŬŽĨŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞŝŶ^ƌĞďƌĞŶŝĐĂ ?,98 
thus demanding that FRY prioritise the threat and dedicate more resources to its suppression. 
Similarly, in the context of preventing transboundary terrorism the obligation to prevent terrorist 
groups operatiŶŐǁŝƚŚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇŝƐŵŽƌĞĚĞŵĂŶĚŝŶŐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ ‘ƌĞĂůĂŶĚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ?ƌŝƐŬ
of transboundary harm 
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The fact that a state possessed information as to terrorist threats and failed to act 
on it could conceivably be sufficient to render the state responsible if the threats 
are realised, although this would depend on there being clear information 
ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ƌĞĂůĂŶĚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƌŝƐŬ ?ŝŶĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐǁŚĞƌƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞǁĂƐŝŶĂ
position reasonably to prevent deaths and failed to do so.
99
  
 
This is important in the context of cyberspace because it is an instantaneous domain where threats 
can mature quickly and unexpectedly. At one moment a cyber threat may be nascent and remote 
yet, within a matter of seconds and the press of a button, malware can be downloaded and 
launched and the threat can become reality. These factors need to be taken into account when 
assessing whether a state faced with such a rapidly developing cyber threat acted with due diligence 
in its attempt to suppress it. 
 
Second, where the likely consequences of a threat becoming reality are grave and severe a state will 
be required to do more in order to prevent its occurrence and mitigate its effects (and, in the 
aftermath of the incident, punish those responsible). According to the Seabed Disputes Chamber, 
the due diligence standard may 
 
change in relation to the risks involved in the activity. As regards activity in the 
Area it seems reasonable to state that prospecting is, generally speaking, less risky 
than exploration activities which, in turn entail less risk than exploitation. 
Moreover, activities in the Area concerning different kinds of minerals, for 
example, polymetallic nodules on the one hand and polymetallic sulphides or 
                                                          
99
 H Duffy, dŚĞ ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů>Ăǁ (CUP, 2005) 308.  
29 
 
cobalt rich ferromanganese crusts on the other, may require different standards 
of diligence. The standard of due diligence has to be more severe for the riskier 
activities.
100
 
 
In relation to cyber, if the likely consequences of a cyber attack are that the critical national 
infrastructure of the molested state will be disabled or seriously affected and that this will 
pose a risk to life (and especially if this risk extends to a large number of people), in such an 
extreme scenario the territorial state could be required to shut down its computer 
networks entirely. Note however that when deciding whether it is reasonable for a state to 
adopt a particular course of action this assessment must also take into account harm 
caused ƚŽƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ? ‘/ƚǁŽƵůĚ be incongruent to impose the obligation in 
situations in which the burden levied on the territorial state far outweigh the harm being 
ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?101  Thus, calculating reasonableness requires that ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?
scale, and scope of the (potential) harm to both states must be ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ?,102 an exercise 
which is far from straightforward in cyberspace where, not least because of its 
interconnectedness, the exact ramifications of cyber operations are often hard to gauge.  
 
 
5.3 Damage 
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It is a general principle of international law that where a state violates an international legal norm 
responsibility attaches regardless of whether damage is caused;
103
 it is the breach of the 
international legal obligation itself that provides sufficient grounds for invoking state responsibility. 
However, and as Crawford has noted, there are caveats to this general principle and in certain 
instances a primary obligation may stipulate that damage is required in order for state responsibility 
to occur.
104
 Indeed, it some instances it may be the case that a de minimis threshold is built into the 
primary obligation, with responsibility attaching only where serious damage is occasioned.  
 
With regard to the customary obligation to prevent, whether state practice requires damage or even 
serious damage to occur in order to establish state responsibility is especially important when it 
comes to malicious transboundary cyber operations committed by non-state actors. This is because 
whilst such operations will likely violate international law, for example the entitlement of states to 
have their territorial sovereignty preserved, many such operations will often cause no damage to the 
victim state or at most cause minor irritation or inconvenience, such as website defacement or the 
temporary denial of non-critical services. Whether damage is required hinges upon the state practice 
that constitutes this customary obligation. 
 
In the Corfu case the ICJ interpreted state practice as encompassing ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ
of otheƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚseeming to require that additional damage be caused. Similarly, in the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the ICJ concluded that customary international law imposes an 
obligation upon states ƚŽ ‘respect ƚŚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶagain being that 
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it is the violation of the international legal rights of other states that gives rise to responsibility, 
regardless of whether damage is caused.
105
  
 
In the Trail Smelter case however the Tribunal explained that state responsibility arises only where 
an injury is caused that is of  ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ? to the victim state.106 The Tallinn Manual adopts 
ĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚƵĞĚŝůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽŶůǇĞǆƚĞŶĚƐƚŽ ‘ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƚhat inflict 
serious damage, or have the potential to inflict such damage, on persons and objects protected by 
ƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚĂƌŐĞƚ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?107 Damage here does not refer exclusively to physical 
damage but includes damage to computer systems or networks that produce serious consequences 
such as where networks that sustain critical national infrastructure are disabled.
108
  
 
Whilst it is correct that the rationale for the customary obligation to prevent transboundary harm is 
to ensure that the territory of a state is not used in a manner incompatible with the sovereign rights 
of another state,
109
 in the context of malicious transboundary cyber operations Schmitt accurately 
notes that to date  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ has been no suggestion from any quarter that the duty extends to mere 
irritation or inconvenience  ?Rather, harm must rise to such a level that it becomes a legitimate 
concern in intra-state relations and, thus, an appropriate subject of international law right and 
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?110 The predominant view, then, is that in order to establish a violation of the customary 
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶŝŶĨƌŝŶŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞŐĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐŵƵƐƚŽĐĐƵƌ
and, in addition, this must produce serious (physical or non-physical) damage. 
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If serious damage occurs the next question is whether it is the occurrence of such damage that gives 
ƌŝƐĞƚŽƐƚĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŵƵƐƚďĞĂĐĂƐƵĂůŶĞǆƵƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽ
take preventative steps and the subsequent occurrence of serious damage.  
 
The answer to this question depends on the content of the primary norm and not upon secondary 
rules of state responsibility. This being said, in relation to international obligations that are 
conditioned by the due diligence standard, the emerging approach is that responsibility will be 
incurred only where it can be shown that the state failed to take measures that were reasonably 
available to it and that such action might have contributed to avoiding the damage. In the Genocide 
case for example the ICJ explained that state responsibility for a failure to prevent genocide is 
ŝŶĐƵƌƌĞĚ ‘ŝĨƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚůǇĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞĂůůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚƐ
power, and which might have contributed to preventing the ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ?111 Similarly, in the Keenan 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which was addressing Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights which requires member states not only to refrain from depriving 
individuals within its jurisdiction of their right to life but also obligates states to take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of such individuals, it was explained 
 
&ŽƌĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽĂƌŝƐĞ ?ŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ
knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a 
third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their 
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powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that 
risk.
112
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has revealed that customary international law imposes an obligation upon states to 
prevent cyber infrastructure located upon their territory from being used in a manner injurious to 
the rights of other states. This obligation contains two distinct duties. The first duty is an obligation 
of result and imposes an absolute obligation upon states to implement laws and institutions that are 
capable of preventing their territory from being used in such a way as to violate the international 
legal rights of other states. Where states possess such capacity the second duty imposed upon them 
is an obligation of conduct in the sense that where a threat emerges and states have (actual or 
constructive) knowledge of that threat they must act reasonably in utilising their capacity and 
resources to suppress it. What is reasonable in the circumstances will depend upon the various 
factors operating at the time but, in particular, the extent of the resources available to the state and 
the risks associated with the threat will be of crucial consideration.  
 
This article has demonstrated that the obligation to prevent doctrine does offer states a certain 
degree of legal protection from malicious transboundary cyber conduct committed by non-state 
actors and that the utility of this doctrine should not be overlooked, which is currently the case in 
international legal literature. This being said, the effectiveness of this customary obligation is limited. 
In relation to the first duty contained within the obligation of prevention, international law confers 
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upon states a wide margin of appreciation as to what minimum legislative and institutional 
measures are necessary to discharge this international legal duty. This duty therefore lacks the 
specificity that is needed in order to create those laws and institutions that are necessary to enable 
states to effectively address the various threats emerging from cyberspace. In relation to the second 
duty, it imposes differentiated responsibilities upon states relative to their capacity and the concern 
is that in a heavily interconnected domain like cyberspace non-state actors will forum-shop and 
reroute their malicious cyber operations through the cyber infrastructure of less technologically 
capable states in order to minimise the possibility of the host state being able to suppress the 
activity.
113
  
 
For these reasons, and especially as cyberspace becomes increasingly sophisticated with the 
emergenĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĞƚŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?and thus the threats associated with cyberspace continue to 
develop and evolve, it will be necessary to devise an international treaty (or even several 
international treaties) to regulate how states address threats emerging from cyberspace.  The use of 
treaty law offers two main benefits. 
 
First, ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĞĂƚǇĐĂŶ ‘ƵƉŐƌĂĚĞ ?114 state obligations by requiring states to adopt those 
specific laws and institutions that are considered necessary to suppress cyber threats. This could 
require, for example, states to criminalise certain forms of conduct, impose detailed regulatory 
frameworks upon providers of ICT and create CERTS that have expertise in detecting cyber threats 
and vulnerabilities and responding to incidents once they occur. 
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Second, an international treaty can require states to proactively cooperate over issues of cyber 
security. As I have shown, the obligation to prevent transboundary harm requires states to 
cooperate with other states over cyber threats that emanate from their cyber infrastructure. Indeed, 
more generally Peters accurately notes that the corollary of the customary international law 
ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƵƉŽŶƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůůǇŝƐ ‘ĂŐĞŶĞƌĂů ?ĐƵƐƚŽŵĂƌǇůĂǁ-based duty to 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĂǀŝĞǁƚŽĂƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?115  However, both of these international legal duties to 
cooperate are reactive in the sense that they only apply to known cyber threats or a where a cyber 
threat endangers international peace and security. In order to create a secure cyberspace what is 
needed is prospective cooperation and collaboration between the relevant stakeholders (including 
international organisations, states, software providers, cyber security companies etc) over issues of 
cyber security and internet governance.
116
 A commitment encompassing such diverse actors to this 
type of dense, future-orientated cooperation can only be achieved through an international treaty. 
In addition, in order to ensure effective cooperation between stakeholders detailed procedural 
obligations would need to be imposed. These may include, for example, the requirement that states 
create domestic authorities that can act as 24/7 points of contact and which can liaise and interact 
with similar authorities in other states over cyber vulnerabilities and cyber threats and even the 
creation of supranational institutions that provide a forum for states and other stakeholders to meet 
to discuss threats connected with cyberspace, debate potential solutions, share information, set 
agendas, take collective decisions, exchange best practices and assist less developed states with 
enhancing their cyber capacity. Such detailed procedural obligations cannot be imposed by the 
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 WĞƚĞƌƐ ? ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƉƵƚĞ^ĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ PEĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƵƚŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?European Journal 
of International Law 1, 9. 
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 That a vibrant and secure cyberspace can only be achieved where states and other stakeholders actively 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŽǀĞƌĐǇďĞƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐǁĂƐƚŚĞŐŝƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌŽƵƉŽĨ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ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duties to cooperate that currently exist under customary international law
117
 but would need to be 
specifically crafted and implemented by a treaty.  
 
There have been soft law attempts to create procedures and institutions to forge this type of 
cooperation.  For example, the Global Forum for Cyber Expertise (GFCE) was launched in April 2015 
and contains 50 members including states, international organisations and representatives from the 
private sector such as Microsoft and Symantec. The objective of GFCE ŝƐƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ
best practices and expertise on cyber capacity building. The aim is to identify successful policies, 
practices and ideas and multiply these on a global level. Together with partners from NGOs, the tech 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇĂŶĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĂ'&ŵĞŵďĞƌƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽďƵŝůĚĐǇďĞƌĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ? ?118 
Entities such as these should be encouraged and represent a step in the right direction towards 
securing closer cooperation over cyber security. Fundamentally, however, such soft law mechanisms 
cannot be the substitute for effective international legal regimes that compel states to adopt cyber-
specific laws and institutions that are sufficient to address threats that emerge from cyberspace and 
to work with supranational agencies and authorities that facilitate and encourage close cooperation 
and capacity building between the relevant stakeholders. 
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